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abstract
How	do	people	explain	their	behavior	in	socially	unacceptable	political	situations?	
Exploring	this	question	will	give	us	insight	into	how	the	public	responds	to	and	
frames	collective	decisions	regarding	controversial	topics.	We	analyze	accounts	of	
the	outcomes	of	racially	sensitive	statewide	referenda	in	two	states	to	understand	
the	public	responses	to	such	political	predicaments.	Distinguishing	four	broad	cat-
egories	of	these	accounts—denials,	justifications,	excuses,	and	confessions—we	find	
some	clear-cut	differences	in	their	use	between	proponents	and	opponents	of	the	
ballot	measures.	These	results	have	implications	for	political	thought	and	dialogue	
regarding	politically-sensitive	issues	and	other	heated	policy	issues.	We	also	discuss	
how	the	different	account	dynamics	in	these	two	cases	presaged	subsequent	political	
developments	in	these	states,	which	might	provide	insights	into	why	some	such	cases	
continue	to	be	fiercely	contested	while	others	fade	from	public	debate.
people in situations	that	others	consider	“strange,	crazy,	untoward,	
immoral,	or	inexplicable”	(Tedeschi	and	Norman	1985,	297)	will	try	to	extri-
cate	themselves	by	formulating	exculpatory	verbal	accounts.1	Politics	is	an	
unusually	fertile	domain	of	human	activity	for	such	accounts	since	so	much	
of	what	goes	on	in	politics	involves	avoiding	blame,	minimizing	problems,	
denying	that	anything	has	gone	wrong,	or	in	the	last	resort,	confessing	that	
“mistakes”	or	“poor	decisions”	were	made	in	the	hope	of	forgiveness.	Recent	
examples	would	include	President	Clinton’s	repeated—and	increasingly	legal-
istic—denials	that	he	“did	not	have	sexual	relations	with	that	woman,	Miss	
Lewinsky”;	and	President	Reagan’s	use	of	the	“past	exonerative”	to	discuss	the	
Iran-Contra	scandal,	acknowledging	that	“mistakes	were	made”	while	avoid-
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ing	taking	any	responsibility	or	detailing	the	nature	of	the	missteps.	But	what	
do	we	really	know	about	such	incidents?	Do	they	have	important	implications	
for	our	understanding	of	political	behavior,	policy	outcomes,	or	democratic	
theory	and	practice?
	 Considerable	research	has	been	conducted	on	how	people	respond	to	
various	types	of	political	accounts	(Chanley	et	al.	1994;	Gonzales	et	al.	1995;	
McGraw	1990,	1991;	Riordan,	Marlin,	and	Kellogg	1983),	usually	with	experi-
ments	designed	to	evoke	reactions	to	stylized	accounts	offered	by	simulated	
politicians	enmeshed	in	hypothetical	scandals.	However,	little	is	known	about	
the	circumstances	under	which	those	involved	in	political	predicaments	
actually	produce	such	accounts.	This	situation	has	prompted	calls—largely	
unheeded—for	analyses	of	the	ways	that	both	participants	and	onlookers	
account	for	real	political	predicaments	(e.g.,	McGraw	1990,	129;	Fenno	
1978,	162,	who	speaks	of	the	need	for	“theories	that	explain	explaining”).	
To	be	sure,	typologies	of	political	accounts	are	available	(Bennett	1980;	
Weaver	1986),	as	are	analyses	of	account	strategies	in	non-political	contexts	
(Felson	and	Ribner	1981;	Rosenquist	1932).	Reasons	why	so	few	studies	of	
this	important	political	phenomenon	have	been	conducted	are	that	such	
predicaments	usually	arise	suddenly	and	unexpectedly	and	therefore	do	
not	lend	themselves	to	standard	modes	of	social	science	research,	such	as	
opinion	surveys,	and	the	psychological	processes	at	work	are	difficult	to	
simulate	validly	in	the	laboratory.
	 The	limited	work	that	has	been	done	in	this	area	has	focused	on	how	
journalists	interpret	election	outcomes	and	other	political	events	(Hershey	
1992;	Kingdon	1966).	The	production	of	political	accounts	seems	to	peak	
in	two	situations:	immediately	after	an	election,	when	candidates	and	others	
vie	to	put	their	own	interpretation	on	the	outcome	(Hershey	1992;	Thomas	
and	Baas	1996)2,	and	during	a	scandal,	when	the	alleged	wrong-doers	and	
their	accusers	swap	accusations	and	denials.	Given	this	tendency,	election	
outcomes	that	are	somehow	deemed	scandalous	or	shameful	are	especially	
likely	to	produce	frenzies	of	account-giving	and,	therefore,	be	fruitful	venues	
for	the	study	of	this	phenomenon.
	 We	examine	account-giving	by	taking	advantage	of	such	a	situation	in	two	
statewide	referenda	that	attracted	national	attention	as	evidence	of	pervasive	
racism	in	the	states	involved:	the	1990	rejection	by	Arizonans	of	a	proposed	
holiday	honoring	Dr.	Martin	Luther	King,	Jr.	and	the	2001	rejection	by	Mis-
sissippians	of	a	proposal	to	replace	the	Confederate	emblem	on	their	state	
flag	with	a	new	design	less	offensive	to	African	Americans.	These	events	
present	excellent	opportunities	to	extend	our	understanding	of	the	social	
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construction	of	reality	by	allowing	us	to	focus	on	public	accounts	of	these	
politically-sensitive	outcomes.
	 Our	study	supplements	and	extends	initial	work	in	this	area	by	Sigelman	
and	Walkosz	(1992),	who	studied	one	of	our	cases	(the	King	holiday	vote	
in	Arizona).	First,	we	examine	two	broadly	similar	events.	Second,	unlike	
Sigelman	and	Walkosz,	who	examined	only	letters	to	the	editor,	we	analyze	a	
wider	range	of	published	reactions	to	these	referendum	outcomes,	including	
various	types	of	news	stories	and	editorials,	as	well	as	letters	to	the	editor.	
Together,	these	additional	data	enhance	the	generalizability	of	our	study.	
Third,	and	most	important,	where	Sigelman	and	Walkosz’s	principal	interest	
was	simply	to	use	letters	to	the	editor	to	“provide	an	accurate	gauge	of	public	
thinking	on	controversial	issues”	(1992,	945),	our	theoretical	concerns	are	
more	expansive.	Our	data	provide	the	leverage	needed	to	develop	a	theo-
retical,	meaningful	typology	of	these	accounts.	This	typology	provides	us	
with	insights	into	the	dynamics	of	public	posturing	over	divisive	issues.	In	
particular,	our	analysis	of	the	accounts	helps	us	explain	the	oft-noted	phe-
nomenon	of	political	opponents	on	a	contentious	issue	to	speak	past	each	
other,	limiting	fruitful	dialogue.	Our	results	also	provide	some	insights	into	
how	the	structure	of	public	dialogue	may	contribute	to	the	resolution	(or	
non-resolution)	of	contentious	issues.
post hoc accounts of sensitive phenomenon
An	account	of	any	phenomenon	is	simply	an	explanation	of	why	that	phe-
nomenon	occurred	as	it	did.	Accounts	of	phenomena	that	are	potential-
ly	embarrassing,	unsettling,	or	controversial	cause	a	predicament	for	the	
account-giver.	There	is	a	tension	between	telling	the	unvarnished	truth	and	
modifying,	by	omission,	change,	or	addition,	the	truth.	This	temptation	to	
modify	an	account	can	be	conscious	or	even	unconscious,	since	the	urge	to	
justify	one’s	actions	to	others	and	even	to	oneself	is	so	powerful.
	 Winston	Churchill’s	oft-quoted	remark,	“History	will	be	kind	to	me	for	
I	intend	to	write	it,”	conveys	the	idea	that	people	are	more	likely	to	be	the	
heroes	than	the	villains	of	the	stories	they	tell.	People	have	a	natural	affinity	
for	explanations	of	past	events	that	cast	a	favorable	light	on	themselves	and	
those	with	whom	they	identify	(Heider	1958;	Hewstone	1990;	Pettigrew	1979).	
The	self-serving	bias	consists	of	the	tendency	to	attribute	one’s	successes	
to	one’s	own	efforts	while	seeing	one’s	failures	as	stemming	from	external	
causes	(Kingdon	1966).	People	are	less	reluctant	to	embrace	accounts	that	
reflect	unfavorably	on	other	people	or	groups.	Therefore,	accounts	offered	
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by	different	people	of	the	same	predicament-causing	event	may,	like	eye-
witness	testimony	in	a	trial	or	the	tales	of	Roshomon’s	seven	samurai,	differ	
markedly.
	 Scholars	have	identified	four	fundamental	types	of	accounts	of	predica-
ment-causing	events	(Schlenker	1980;	Schönbach	1990;	Lyman	and	Scott	
1968;	Snyder	and	Higgins	1988;	Weiner,	Figueroa,	and	Kakihara	1991).	“Deni-
al”	is	a	claim	that	the	event	did	not	actually	occur	or	that	the	account-giver	
had	little	or	nothing	to	do	with	it.	A	variant	of	denial	involves	reframing	
the	event,	or	one’s	involvement	in	it,	so	as	to	lessen	its	perceived	negativity;	
providing	an	acceptable	rationale	for	why	it	occurred;	or	suggesting	that	it	
was	nothing	out	of	the	ordinary.	A	“justification”	is	an	account	that	stops	
short	of	denying	the	event	or	one’s	involvement	in	it,	minimizes	the	scope	
or	undesirability	of	the	event,	sometimes	invoking	countervailing	norma-
tive	claims	or	criteria	(Schlenker	1980,	138).	Third	is	providing	an	“excuse”	
for	the	event.	An	excuse	occurs	when	one	refuses	to	take	responsibility	for	
“what	is	admittedly	an	offensive	act”	(Semin	and	Manstead	1983,	80).	The	
fourth	and	final	account	is	simply	offering	an	admission	or	“confession.”3
	 These	four	types	of	accounts	likely	constitute	a	hierarchy	in	terms	of	
their	appeal	to	those	who	use	them.	An	account	that	produces	total	exculpa-
tion	(denial)	is	obviously	preferable	in	a	predicament,	other	factors	being	
equal,	to	one	that	can	result	only	in	partial	exoneration	(justification),	which	
in	turn	is	preferable	to	an	account	that	has	little	potential	to	absolve	the	
accused	(excuse)	or	one	that	might	even	aggravate	the	situation	(confes-
sion).	A	plausible	denial	might	make	a	predicament	disappear	altogether.	
A	good	justification	will	not	do	this,	but	it	can	keep	a	predicament	within	
manageable	bounds.	If	untoward	actions	cannot	be	denied	or	justified,	then	
an	excuse	may	be	a	plausible	fallback.	All	else	failing,	the	last	alternative	may	
be	to	admit	one’s	guilt.
	 Those	who	find	themselves	groping	for	a	way	out	of	a	predicament	do	
not	necessarily,	or	even	consciously,	begin	at	the	top	of	this	account	hierarchy	
and	work	their	way	downward,	step-by-step,	until	they	reach	an	acceptable	
explanation	for	a	given	audience.	Other	factors	related	to	the	account-giver,	
the	environment,	and	the	relationship	between	the	account-giver	and	lis-
tener	likely	have	an	effect	on	the	account	that	is	given.	For	example,	people	
may	offer	an	account	that	they	believe	is	true	even	though	they	know	this	
account	may	cause	others	to	think	less	of	them	or	may	not	sit	well	with	their	
audience.	Similarly,	well-known	facts	may	limit	the	availability	(or	at	least	
the	plausibility)	of	these	account	types	in	particular	cases.	However,	in	terms	
of	the	potential	for	repairing	one’s	image,	there	does	appear	to	be	a	clear	
ordering	of	the	desirability	of	the	four	types	of	accounts.
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	 Thus,	we	hypothesize	that	accounts	of	predicament-causing	events	will	
vary	in	systematic	and	predictable	ways	depending	on	the	predispositions	of	
the	account-givers.	The	implication	is	straightforward	for	our	two	cases.	When	
well-publicized	referenda	outcomes	brought	disparagement	and	charges	of	
racism	from	commentators	in	the	rest	of	the	country,	those	Arizonans	who	
had	voted	for	the	King	holiday	and	those	Mississippians	who	had	voted	for	
a	new	state	flag	would	have	formulated	significantly	different	accounts	from	
those	who	supported	the	outcomes.	Specifically,	we	anticipate	that	referen-
dum	proponents	are	more	likely	to	offer	accounts	that	stress	excuses	or	make	
collective	confessions	for	the	outcome	they	did	not	personally	support,	while	
referendum	opponents	are	more	likely	to	proffer	accounts	that	deny	racism	
or	justify	the	result	on	grounds	other	than	racist	motivations.
the two political predicaments
To	test	our	hypothesis,	we	have	identified	two	political	events	that	cast	states’	
electorates	in	national	disrepute	and	that	citizens	and	editorial	writers	felt	a	
need	to	explain	afterward.	These	events	were	referendum	results	that	appeared	
to	expose	these	states’	electorates	to	aspersions	of	racism.
	 On	November	6,	1990,	Arizona	voters	rejected	two	referendum	measures	
that	would	have	established	a	new	state	holiday	honoring	Dr.	Martin	Luther	
King,	Jr.	(“King	Day”).	Proposition	302,	which	would	have	added	King	Day	
as	a	new	paid	holiday	for	state	employees,	failed	narrowly	by	a	49.4	percent	to	
50.6	percent	margin.	Proposition	301,	which	would	have	replaced	Columbus	
Day	with	King	Day	as	a	paid	holiday	for	state	workers,	received	only	24.7	
percent	of	the	vote.	There	had	been	no	concerted	campaign	pushing	for	the	
passage	of	Proposition	301,	reflecting	an	accord	among	pro-holiday	forces	
to	concentrate	on	Proposition	302.
	 The	defeat	of	the	1990	King	Day	propositions	added	a	new	chapter	to	the	
holiday’s	topsy-turvy	history	in	Arizona.	Four	years	earlier,	Governor	Bruce	
Babbitt	had	proclaimed	a	paid	King	Day	for	state	employees,	but	his	succes-
sor,	Evan	Mecham,	rescinded	the	holiday,	offending	those	who	revered	King’s	
memory	(O’Neil	1991).	Mecham’s	action	triggered	“a	firestorm	of	criticism,”	
highlighted	by	a	march	on	the	State	Capitol	by	an	estimated	10,000	protesters	
and	boycotts	of	the	state	by	numerous	entertainers	and	conventions	(McClain	
1988,	631).	In	response,	Mecham	created	an	unpaid	Sunday	King	Day,	but	
the	legislature,	sensitive	to	widespread	criticism	of	the	state	and	its	potential	
economic	repercussions,	enacted	a	paid	King	Day.	Opponents	of	the	holiday	
then	succeeded	in	referring	the	issue	to	the	voters.	A	coalition	of	civil	rights	
and	business	interests	united	behind	the	theme	“Support	Civil	Rights,	Help	
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Arizona,”	to	wage	a	vigorous	campaign	for	Proposition	302;	in	contrast,	the	
anti-holiday	campaign	was	“virtually	invisible”	(Sigelman	and	Walkosz,	1992,	
939).4
	 Following	the	defeat	of	both	propositions,	the	state	was	left	to	“live	with	
the	stigma	of	[their]	rejection”	(Broder	1990),	a	point	hammered	home	by	
expressions	of	shock	and	dismay	from	both	inside	and	outside	the	state.	The	
Washington Post	quoted	former	Arizona	House	Speaker	Joe	Lane	as	saying	
that	in	Arizona	“there	is	still	a	lot	of	racism	out	there,	whether	people	will	
admit	it	or	not”	(Stanton	1990).	Governor	Rose	Mofford,	nonplussed	when	
a	television	interviewer	asked	her	whether	Arizona	was	a	racist	state,	falter-
ingly	responded,	“Well,	I	feel	now	that	somewhat	it	is”	(Cohn	and	Burgess	
1990).	National	civil	rights	leaders	issued	statements	of	outrage.	The	execu-
tive	director	of	Operation	PUSH	advised	Arizona	voters	to	“hold	their	heads	
in	shame	because	they	refused	to	accept	a	message	of	love	from	a	man	of	
color,”	while	the	president	of	the	Southern	Christian	Leadership	Conference	
likened	the	“insensitive	majority”	of	Arizonans	to	members	of	the	Ku	Klux	
Klan	and	warned	that	all	Arizonans	would	suffer	the	consequences	of	the	
vote	(Murphy	1990).	As	if	to	bear	out	that	prophecy,	the	National	Football	
League	announced	that	because	of	the	“negative	and	divisive	message”	of	
the	King	Day	vote,	it	was	relocating	the	1993	Super	Bowl	that	had	been	
planned	for	Tempe,	a	Phoenix	suburb	(Sigelman	and	Walkosz,	1992,	940).	
National	commentators	compared	Arizona	unfavorably	to	Mississippi	and	
Alabama,	and	editorial	cartoonists	had	a	field	day;	Oliphant,	for	example,	
sketched	a	“Welcome	to	Arizona”	highway	sign	that	proclaimed	a	“Martin	
Luther	King-Free	Zone”	bilingually—in	English	and	Afrikaans,	the	language	
of	South	African	apartheid.
	 Entrenched	and	widespread	racism	in	Arizona	was	by	no	means	the	only	
explanation	for	the	defeats	of	Propositions	301	and	302.	As	our	study	shows,	
there	were	many	influences	on	these	votes,	and	it	is	not	certain	that	racism	
was	even	among	the	most	important	of	them.	Nonetheless,	racism	was	the	
account	that	gained	currency	nationally	and	thereby	created	a	predicament	
for	Arizonans.	Whereas	it	had	been	possible	to	dismiss	Mecham	as	an	aberra-
tion	who	did	not	represent	popular	sentiment	on	this	issue,	Arizonans	could	
not	deny	that	the	defeat	of	King	Day	resulted	from	the	actions	of	hundreds	
of	thousands	of	their	co-residents	of	the	state.	In	a	survey	conducted	in	late	
November	1990,	80	percent	of	Phoenix-area	residents	said	they	expected	the	
defeat	of	the	holiday	to	damage	the	state;	only	17	percent	expected	Arizona	
to	emerge	unscathed	(Creno	1990).
	 For	our	second	case	of	a	political	predicament,	we	considered	the	after-
math	of	the	April	2001	referendum,	when	Mississippians	voted	65–35,	to	
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retain	their	state’s	107-year-old	flag,	which	combined	elements	of	the	Con-
federate	battle	flag	and	the	first	official	Confederate	flag,	rejecting	a	new	
design	that	featured	stars	symbolizing	Mississippi’s	admission	to	the	United	
States	as	the	twentieth	state.	This	referendum	evolved	from	a	lawsuit	filed	
against	the	state	in	1993	by	the	NAACP,	which	argued	that	the	flag	was	a	racist	
symbol.	Ultimately,	the	Mississippi	Supreme	Court	rejected	that	argument,	
holding	that	the	flag	“does	not	deprive	any	citizen	of	any	constitutionally	pro-
tected	right”	(Mississippi	Supreme	Court	ruling,	No.	94–CA-00615–SCT).	
In	the	course	of	these	legal	wranglings,	the	state	Supreme	Court	also	ruled	
that	the	legislation	authorizing	the	1894	flag	had	actually	expired	in	1906,	
rendering	the	legal	status	of	the	flag	questionable.	Seeking	to	extricate	itself	
from	the	contretemps,	the	court	handed	the	matter	over	to	the	legislative	and	
executive	branches,	which	also	dodged	the	political	hot	potato	by	appointing	
a	commission	empowered	to	design	an	official	state	flag.	The	commission	
recommended	a	new	flag	design,	which	was	then	pitted	against	the	old	flag	
in	the	referendum.5
	 As	in	Arizona,	many	state	leaders	sensed	there	would	be	trouble	if	the	vote	
failed	and	tried	to	rally	support	for	the	new	flag.	Governor	Ronnie	Musgrove	
portrayed	it	as	a	symbol	of	progress	for	the	state:	“We	believe	that	it’s	time	
to	move	forward	in	Mississippi.	Our	past	is	very	important	but	we	shouldn’t	
dwell	in	our	past”	(Sawyer	2001,	1A).	Musgrove’s	endorsement	was	seconded	
by	several	former	governors	and	other	prominent	Mississippians.	The	Missis-
sippi	Economic	Council,	a	business	group,	fearful	of	the	impact	on	tourism	
and	industrial	development,	emphasized	that	“those	outside	our	borders	still	
struggle	with	conflicting	images	of	our	state	.	.	.	many	of	them	not	so	positive”	
(Kanengiser	2001,	12A).
	 The	campaigns	for	and	against	this	referendum	were	virtual	mirror	imag-
es	of	those	in	Arizona	in	1990.	Unlike	the	pro-King	Day	effort	in	Arizona,	the	
campaign	for	the	new	flag	was	low-key;	despite	a	hefty	war	chest	(roughly	
$750,000),	no	television	ads	or	“eye-catching	billboards”	appeared	(Mitchell	
2001,	1A).	In	contrast,	defenders	of	the	old	flag	held	rallies	and	made	strong	
appeals	for	grassroots	support.	Perhaps	as	a	consequence,	most	Mississip-
pians	did	not	necessarily	believe	that	a	vote	against	the	new	flag	would	reflect	
negatively	on	the	state.	In	a	statewide	survey	conducted	prior	to	the	vote,	58	
percent	said	that	keeping	the	old	flag	would	have	no	impact	on	Mississippi’s	
image,	and	another	14	percent	went	even	further,	saying	that	a	vote	for	the	
old	flag	would	have	a	positive	impact	on	Mississippi’s	image	(Gater	2001).
	 National	reaction	to	the	flag	vote	proved	these	optimistic	expectations	
to	be	inaccurate.	National	newspapers	lambasted	the	state.	Cartoonist	Mike	
Ritter	of	the	Tribune	Newspapers	drew	a	redneck	spelling	“M-I-S-S-I-S-S-
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I-K-K-K-I-P-P-I.”	The	National	Collegiate	Athletic	Association	disqualified	
the	state	from	hosting	national	championships	in	intercollegiate	athletics,	
thereby	denying	Delta	State	University	the	opportunity	to	host	the	national	
swimming	championships	in	its	new	aquatic	center.	The	NAACP	threatened	
an	economic	boycott,	and	members	of	the	historically	black	fraternity,	Alpha	
Phi	Alpha,	and	the	International	Association	of	Black	Professional	Firefight-
ers	decided	not	to	meet	in	Mississippi.	Just	as	had	occurred	in	Arizona	a	
decade	earlier,	a	dark	cloud	of	perceived	racism	hung	over	the	state,	and	
Mississippians	found	themselves	having	to	account	for	a	political	event	that	
had	made	them	a	target	of	scorn	and	ridicule	in	much	of	the	rest	of	the	
country.6
cataloguing the accounts
How	did	Arizonans	and	Mississippians	account	for	these	referendum	out-
comes	that	engendered	so	much	ill	will	toward	their	states	in	the	rest	of	the	
country?	The	ideal	way	to	answer	this	question	would	be	to	analyze	the	states’	
residents’	responses	to	open-ended	questions	on	the	subject.	Unfortunately,	
such	data	are	not	available.7	As	an	alternate	research	strategy,	we	combed	
Arizona	and	Mississippi	newspapers	for	accounts	of	the	outcomes	of	these	
referenda.	Of	course,	our	reliance	on	media	sources	rather	than	opinion	
surveys	meant	that	the	accounts	we	located	and	analyzed	are	not	those	of	a	
representative	sample	of	voters	or	the	general	public	in	either	state.	Rather,	
they	constitute	the	population—or	as	close	to	the	population	as	we	were	
able	to	find—of	the	accounts	of	the	outcomes	of	these	referenda	that	were	
freely	and	publicly	offered	in	the	print	media	soon	after	those	elections	in	
these	two	states.	As	Hershey	(1992,	948)	puts	it,	“The	best	place	to	find	.	.	.	
explanations	for	election	results	is	in	the	media.”8	As	such,	our	data	provide	
good	examples	of	accounts	of	a	predicament-generating	election	outcome.	
They	also	offer	one	other	signal	advantage	over	survey	data,	in	that	they	
represent	accounts	developed	over	an	extended	period	after	the	referenda,	
usually	in	a	more	thoughtful	and	reasoned	way	than	snap	judgments	offered	
to	pollsters	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	votes.9
	 To	catalogue	Arizonans’	accounts	of	the	defeat	of	King	Day,	we	tran-
scribed	every	passage	that	advanced	an	account	of	the	defeat	of	King	Day,	
from	news,	sports,	and	feature	stories,	columns,	editorials,	and	letters	to	the	
editor	published	in	15	of	Arizona’s	19	daily	newspapers	during	the	month	
immediately	following	the	referenda	(November	7–December	6,	1990).10	
During	that	period,	newspapers	were	brimming	with	such	accounts.	In	
all,	we	collected	479	accounts	advanced	by	278	different	Arizonans.	Of	
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the	account-givers,	57	percent	were	letter-writers11	or	other	members	of	
the	general	public,	24	percent	were	public	notables	of	one	sort	or	another,	
and	the	remaining	19	percent	were	newspaper	columnists	and	editorialists.	
Based	on	their	comments,	we	placed	142	of	the	account-givers	(51	percent)	
as	proponents	of	the	King	holiday	and	79	(28	percent)	as	opponents.	We	
were	unable	to	categorize	the	remaining	57	(21percent)	with	any	reason-
able	certainty.12	We	classified	each	account	using	the	system	of	categories	
in	Table	1	below,	subsuming	each	category	within	the	four-part	typology	
of	denials,	justifications,	excuses,	and	confessions.13
	 We	used	the	same	procedures	to	catalogue	Mississippians’	accounts	of	
the	outcome	of	the	state	flag	referendum.	For	the	period	from	April	18,	2001	
to	May	17,	2001,	we	transcribed	every	account	of	the	outcome	published	in	
10	of	the	state’s	12	daily	newspapers	with	a	circulation	of	9,000	or	more.14	
In	all,	we	identified	249	accounts	offered	by	211	sources.	Of	these	accounts,	
46	percent	appeared	in	letters	to	the	editor,	23	percent	in	editorials,	and	29	
percent	in	news	articles.	Of	the	account-givers,	86	(41	percent)	were	propo-
nents	of	the	new	flag,	95	(45	percent)	were	opponents,	and	the	remaining	
30	(14	percent)	were	unclassifiable.15
results
In	Arizona,	denials	took	two	forms.	The	first	consisted	of	assertions	that	
most	voters	had	actually	supported	a	King	holiday.	The	key	support	for	this	
account	was	the	fact	that	of	the	two	separate	King	Day	propositions	that	had	
appeared	on	the	ballot,	one	fell	just	short	of	passage	and	the	other	garnered	
a	quarter	of	the	votes.	Based	on	the	argument	that	most	voters	had	voted	for	
one	proposition	or	the	other,16	these	account-givers	claimed	that	the	out-
come	was	a	consequence	of	disagreement	only	over	the	precise	form	of	the	
holiday,	not	of	opposition	to	the	holiday,	per	se.	The	second	type	of	denial	
challenged	the	premise	that	the	defeat	of	King	Day	was	proof	of	rampant	
racism	in	Arizona.	According	to	these	account-givers,	such	a	reading	could	
not	be	accurate,	simply	because	most	Arizonans	are	not	racists.	In	Mississippi,	
only	the	second	of	these	two	forms	of	denial	was	available	to	account-givers,	
given	the	circumstances	of	the	election.	Some	did,	however,	deny	the	impli-
cation	that	Mississippians	are	racists;	a	representative	statement	was	“The	
vote	in	Mississippi	to	retain	the	107–year-old	state	flag	.	.	.	is	being	depicted	
in	the	news	as	a	racial	issue.	It	isn’t”	(Johnson	2001,	6A).
	 Arizonans’	justifications	of	the	defeat	of	King	Day	took	three	forms.	Some	
claimed	that	the	outcome	stemmed	from	qualms	about	Dr.	King	himself,	
not	from	hostility	to	African	Americans	in	general.17	Others	portrayed	the	
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outcome	as	an	expression	of	Arizonans’	commitment	to	such	defensible	
principles	as	the	need	to	promote	economy	in	state	government.	According	
to	this	account,	opposition	to	the	holiday	was	based	on	objections	to	giving	
state	employees	another	paid	holiday	at	a	time	when	the	state	was	mired	
in	economic	doldrums	and	when	state	government	was	held	in	ill	repute.	
Because	Arizona	was	the	only	state	where	the	King	holiday	had	been	put	to	
a	popular	vote,	some	account-givers	also	argued	that	if	the	same	referendum	
had	been	conducted	in	other	states,	the	holiday	would	have	been	defeated	
there	also.
	 In	Mississippi,	we	also	found	justifications	based	on	defensible	goals	and	
principles.	In	one	rendition,	the	desire	to	pay	homage	to	the	state’s	storied	
history,	account-givers	characterized	the	outcome	as	a	triumph	of	“heritage,	
not	hate”	and	“ancestor	worship.”18	In	a	justification	based	on	other	principles,	
account-givers	expounded	the	populist	idea	that	the	outcome	was	justifiable	
because	it	was	the	end	product	of	a	democratic	process	(Covington	2001,	10A).	
Justifications	through	comparison	(the	“everybody	would	do	it”	defense)	also	
cropped	up	in	Mississippi,	although	as	in	Arizona,	they	were	rare.
	 The	first	excuse	our	account-givers	gave	for	Arizona’s	rejection	of	the	
King	holiday	was	that	it	was	an	inadvertent	consequence	of	confusion	caused	
by	a	long	and	cluttered	ballot,	voter	apathy,	or	various	shortcomings	of	the	
pro-King	holiday	campaign.	Some	Arizonan	account-givers	also	held	specific	
groups	of	voters	responsible,	especially	retirees	and	residents	of	rural	areas,	
who	were	portrayed	as	not	sharing	in	what	was	portrayed	as	the	state’s	gener-
ally	progressive	racial	climate.19	Others	described	the	outcome	as	a	product	
of	extenuating	circumstances,	such	as	news	reports,	aired	just	two	days	before	
the	referendum,	of	the	threatened	Super	Bowl	loss	for	Tempe	if	the	King	
holiday	were	defeated.	Such	reports	were	said	to	have	provoked	bitter	resent-
ment	against	“outsiders”	and	a	backlash	against	“economic	blackmail.”
	 Some	Mississippi	account-givers	also	engaged	in	scapegoating.	In	an	
ironic	twist,	many	of	them	actually	blamed	African	Americans	for	the	out-
come,	because,	they	said,	blacks	had	failed	to	turn	out	to	vote	for	the	new	flag	
or	had	even	turned	out	to	vote	against	it	(Mitchell	and	Sawyer	2001,	1B	and	
5B).	Indeed,	there	appears	to	be	some	objective	basis	for	this	factual	claim,	if	
not	the	logic	behind	its	use	as	an	excuse.	In	one	statewide	pre-election	poll,	
only	one	white	in	five,	but	a	majority	of	blacks	favored	the	old	flag.20	While	
those	unfamiliar	with	Mississippi	politics	may	find	this	ambivalence	among	
the	state’s	African-American	population	quite	unintuitive,	it	was	often	cited	
as	an	excuse	for	the	outcome.21	Others	pinned	the	blame	on	the	governor,	the	
state	legislature,	or	the	flag	commission.	References	to	external	provocation	
also	figured	in	the	accounts	of	Mississippians	who	portrayed	the	outcome	
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as	a	backlash	against	the	NAACP	or	the	NCAA.	Some	Mississippians	also	
offered	a	“you	can’t	beat	something	with	nothing”	excuse,	claiming	that	
the	design	of	the	proposed	new	flag	was	unappealing	and	lacked	cultural	
resonance	(Crutcher	2001,	12A).
	 Confessions	(sometimes	accusatory,	sometimes	sorrowful)	that	racism	
had	indeed	come	to	the	fore	in	the	King	Day	vote	constituted	the	final	cat-
egory	of	accounts	in	Arizona.	In	Mississippi,	too,	some	account-givers	offered	
confessions,	acknowledging	that	Mississippians	were	actually	proud	of	what	
they	had	done	or	simply	admitting	that	Mississippi	was	a	racist	place.	Rep-
resentative	of	such	interpretations	was	the	statement	that	“This	so-called	
‘person	of	Mississippi’	symbolized	in	the	vote	to	retain	the	flag	of	1894	is	
white	racism”	(Warren	2001,	10A).
Proponents Versus Opponents
An	instrumental	issue	to	consider	is	the	extent	to	which	accounts	offered	by	
proponents	of	the	two	measures	differed	from	those	offered	by	opponents.	In	
the	wake	of	the	two	referenda,	those	who	had	favored	the	proposed	changes	
were	faced	with	the	task	of	accounting	for	outcomes	they	did	not	favor	and	
for	which	they	were	not	personally	responsible,	but	that	were	widely	per-
ceived	as	evidence	of	racism	in	their	home	states.	While	it	would	ill	serve	
their	states	to	carry	the	stigma	of	racism,	beyond	their	collective	stake	in	
refurbishing	their	state’s	image,	proponents	had	relatively	free	rein,	if	they	
were	so	inclined,	to	offer	accounts	that	reflected	critically	on	those	who	had	
opposed	the	referendum	measure.	By	contrast,	opponents	found	themselves	
in	the	predicament	of	having	to	account	for	unpopular	outcomes	they	per-
sonally	favored	and	for	which	they	were	collectively	responsible.	Faced	with	
charges	of	racism,	we	suspect	their	natural	responses	would	be	to	deny	such	
allegations,	to	downplay	the	perceived	negativity	of	the	outcome,	to	situate	
it	within	the	broader	context	of	other	goals	and	principles,	or	to	shift	the	
responsibility	for	it	to	outsiders.
	 Table	1	summarizes	and	juxtaposes	the	accounts	offered	by	proponents	
and	opponents	of	these	racially-sensitive	referenda.	In	Arizona,	the	overall	
proportions	of	proponents	and	opponents	offering	a	denial	was	similar,	but	the	
logic	of	their	denials	differed	dramatically.	Whereas	most	King	Day	proponents	
who	denied	that	their	state	was	racist	contended	that	a	majority	had	actually	
supported	the	holiday	in	one	form	or	the	other,	hardly	any	of	its	opponents	
claimed	this	(26.1	percent	versus	2.5	percent).	Instead,	opponents	were	much	
more	likely	than	proponents	simply	to	deny	that	Arizonans	were	racists,	directly	
contesting	such	a	view	of	their	state	(41.8	percent	versus	16.9	percent).	By	
contrast,	in	Mississippi	neither	proponents	nor	opponents	made	much	use	of	
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denial;	just	one	opponent	in	five	and	one	proponent	in	eight	explicitly	denied	
that	the	defeat	of	the	new	state	flag	stemmed	from	widespread	racism.
	 In	Arizona,	opponents	were	four	times	as	likely	as	proponents	(70.9	per-
cent	versus	18.3	percent)	to	venture	a	justification	for	the	referenda	outcomes.	
A	much	higher	proportion	of	opponents	than	proponents	(13.9	percent	
versus	1.4	percent)	viewed	the	negative	vote	as	aimed	at	King	himself	rather	
than	at	blacks	or	civil	rights.	Much	more	importantly,	far	more	opponents	
than	proponents	(55.7	percent	versus	12.7	percent)	alluded	to	principled	
bases	for	the	rejection	of	the	holiday,	usually	by	attributing	it	to	economy-
minded	voters	who	objected	to	giving	state	employees	another	paid	day	off.	
In	fact,	such	justifications	were	the	single	most	common	account	offered	by	
King	holiday	opponents	in	Arizona.	In	Mississippi,	justifications	were	only	
half	as	common	as	in	Arizona	among	both	opponents	and	proponents	(37.9	
Table 1. Proponents’	and	Opponents’	Accounts	of	the	Outcomes	of	Two	Racially		
Sensitive	Referenda
	 Arizona	 Mississippi
	 Proponents	 Opponents	 Proponents	 Opponents
I. Denials—“Not guilty”	 36.6	 41.8	 12.8	 21.1
	 A.	“We	didn’t	do	it”	
	 	 	 —Denial	that	the	event	occurred	 26.1*	 2.5	 0.0	 0.0
	 B.	“We’re	not	like	that”	
	 	 	 —Denial	that	the	state	is	racist	 16.9*	 41.8	 12.8	 21.1
II. Justifications—“What’s all the fuss about?”	 18.3*	 70.9	 9.3*	 37.9
	 A.	“It’s	really	not	so	bad”	
	 	 	 —Minimization	of	negativity	 1.4*	 13.9	 4.7*	 30.5	
	 B.	“We	had	a	good	reason	for	doing	it”	
	 	 	 —Justification	through	other	goals	 12.7*	 55.7	 3.5	 5.3
	 C.	“Everybody	does	it”—Justification		
	 	 	 through	comparison	 5.6	 6.3	 1.2	 2.1
III. Excuses—“It’s not our fault”	 43.0	 34.2	 41.9	 48.4
	 A.	“We	didn’t	know	what	we		
	 	 	 were	doing”—Unforeseen	circumstances		
	 	 	 or	unexpectedly	poor	effort	 10.6*	 1.3	 0.0	 0.0
	 B.	“We	couldn’t	help	it”—Extenuating		
	 	 	 circumstances	 39.5	 32.9	 58.1*	 37.9
	 	 	 	 1.	“It’s	their	fault”—Scapegoating	 11.3*	 0.0	 30.2	 33.7
	 	 	 	 2.	“The	devil	made	us	do	it”	
	 	 	 	 	 —External	provocation	 28.2	 32.9	 23.3*	 4.2
	 	 	 	 3.	“You	can’t	beat	something		
	 	 	 	 	 with	nothing”—Absence	of	a	viable		
	 	 	 	 	 alternative	 0.0	 0.0	 4.7	 0.0
IV. Confessions—“Guilty as charged”	 34.5*	 0.0	 59.3*	 3.2
N	 142	 79	 86	 95
Note:	*p<.05	in	a	z-test	of	the	within-state	difference	of	proportions	between	proponents	and	opponents.
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percent	and	9.3	percent,	respectively),	perhaps	because	it	was	more	difficult	
for	Mississippians	to	articulate	plausible,	socially	desirable	goals	to	justify	
their	referendum	outcome.	Among	Mississippians,	opponents	of	the	new	flag	
were	almost	four	times	more	likely	than	proponents	to	offer	justifications	
(37.9	percent	to	9.3	percent),	usually	opting	for	a	minimization	account.22
	 In	both	states,	excuses	depicting	the	referendum	outcome	as	inadvertent	
were	unusual;	indeed,	in	Mississippi	we	found	none	of	these.	In	Arizona,	
although	the	raw	numbers	are	relatively	small,	proponents	were	almost	10	
times	more	likely	than	opponents	(10.6	percent	versus	1.3	percent)	to	excuse	
the	outcome	as	a	mistake.	In	Arizona,	roughly	the	same	proportion	of	oppo-
nents	and	proponents	pointed	to	extenuating	circumstances	as	an	excuse	
for	the	outcome.	Proponents	made	greater	use	of	scapegoating	particular	
groups	of	their	fellow	citizens	than	opponents	did	(11.3	percent	versus	0.0	
percent).	This	difference	did	not	hold	in	Mississippi,	where	scapegoating	
was	common	among	both	groups	(30.2	percent	for	proponents	versus	33.7	
percent	for	opponents),	largely	because	both	proponents	and	opponents	were	
prone	to	identify	low	black	turnout	as	one	principal	cause	of	the	result.	We	
found	the	mirror	image	of	the	scapegoating	pattern	for	references	to	external	
provocation.	In	Arizona,	such	references	were	fairly	common	among	both	
proponents	and	opponents	(28.2	percent	and	32.9	percent,	respectively),	many	
of	whom	blamed	the	outcome	on	a	backlash	against	economic	blackmail	and	
the	unwarranted	intrusion	of	outsiders	into	the	state’s	internal	affairs.	In	Mis-
sissippi,	external	provocation	was	a	less	prominent	excuse	overall,	although	
proponents	cited	external	provocations	much	more	often	than	opponents	
did	(23.3	percent	versus	4.2	percent).	As	a	consequence	of	this,	proponents	in	
Mississippi	were	more	likely	than	opponents	to	cite	any	extenuating	circum-
stances	(58.1	percent	versus	37.9	percent),	a	difference	not	seen	in	Arizona.	
Traditional	culture	in	the	deep-South	has	long	been	seen	as	reflexively	resent-
ing	and	rejecting	outside	pressure	(Cash	1941),	so	it	is	odd	that	flag	opponents	
were	virtually	moot	on	this	point,	leaving	it	to	flag	advocates	to	offer	this	as	
a	potential	excuse	for	their	referendum	results.
	 The	starkest	divergence	in	the	accounts	of	proponents	and	opponents	in	
both	states	was	in	their	use	of	confessions.	Whereas	the	acknowledgment	of	
racism	was	the	single	most	prevalent	type	of	account	offered	by	Arizonans	
who	favored	King	Day	(34.5	percent),	no	opponent	went	on	record	suggest-
ing	such	a	rationale.	Even	more	strikingly,	59.3	percent	of	the	Mississippians	
who	favored	the	new	state	flag	blamed	racism	for	its	defeat,	far	outstripping	
every	other	type	of	account	offered	by	proponents.	But	only	3.2	percent	of	
those	who	opposed	the	new	flag	offered	an	account	based	on	racism.
	 In	summary,	denials	and	excuses	were	the	mainstay	accounts	for	both	
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proponents	and	opponents	in	Arizona.	But,	unlike	Arizonans,	relatively	few	
Mississippians	engaged	in	denial,	but	they	did	offer	many	excuses,	irrespective	
of	whether	they	were	in	favor	of	or	against	the	referendum.	In	both	states,	
justifications	were	the	province	of	opponents,	and	confessions	were	the	prov-
ince	of	proponents.	Specifically,	Arizona	proponents	were	more	likely	than	
opponents	to	portray	the	rejection	of	King	Day	as	a	product	of	widespread	
racism,	to	deny	that	most	Arizonans	had	opposed	a	King	holiday,	to	blame	
opposition	by	particular	groups	of	Arizonans,	and	to	allude	to	unforeseen	
circumstances	or	unexpectedly	poor	effort.	Arizona	opponents	were	more	
likely	to	deny	that	Arizonans	were	racist	and	to	offer	accounts	of	the	outcome	
as	the	result	of	acceptable	goals,	not	by	racism.	In	Mississippi,	two	accounts	
that	were	popular	among	opponents	in	Arizona—the	need	for	economy	in	
state	government	(justification	through	other	goals)	and	economic	blackmail	
(external	provocation)—were	much	less	prominent	in	opponents’	accounts,	
presumably	because	those	particular	issues	had	so	little	to	do	with	mobilizing	
opposition	in	Mississippi.	On	the	other	hand,	even	though	Mississippians	
were	no	more	likely	than	Arizonans	to	engage	in	excuse-making,	they	did	
make	more	extensive	use	of	one	type	of	excuse:	scapegoating.
discussion
What	can	we	learn	from	this	analysis	of	Arizonans’	and	Mississippians’	
accounts	of	referendum	outcomes	in	their	states,	which	were	viewed	in	
much	of	the	rest	of	the	country	as	the	visible	“tips	of	icebergs”	of	perva-
sive	racism	(Shields	2003)?	We	think	there	are	lessons	here	both	for	our	
theoretical	understanding	of	how	people	explain	political	behavior	and	our	
understanding	of	racial	politics	in	the	United	States.
	 One	lesson	is	that	even	though	distinguishing	among	denials,	justifica-
tions,	excuses,	and	confessions	is	a	key	to	understanding	how	people	respond	
to	predicaments,	delving	no	more	deeply	than	this	four-part	categorization	
would	cause	one	to	miss	some	dynamics	of	account-giving,	both	subtle	and	
not	so	subtle.	Many	of	the	interesting	contrasts	in	account-giving	in	our	cases	
were	within	each	type	of	account,	not	between	them.	The	best	example	of	this	
is	that	while	proponents	of	the	King	holiday	in	Arizona	were	10	times	more	
likely	than	opponents	to	engage	in	one	form	of	denial	(the	claim	that	most	
voters	had	actually	supported	the	holiday),	opponents	were	two-and-a-half	
times	more	likely	than	proponents	to	engage	in	a	different	form	of	denial	
(the	claim	that	Arizonans	simply	were	not	racists).	Another	example	involved	
excuses	used	in	Mississippi.	Both	opponents	and	proponents	offered	many	
excuses	for	the	outcome,	but	they	differed	in	content.	While	both	groups	
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routinely	offered	up	a	scapegoat	to	account	for	the	vote,	only	proponents	of	
the	new	flag	pinned	part	of	the	blame	on	outside	agitators.
	 A	second	lesson	is	that	although	denials,	justifications,	excuses,	and	con-
fessions	may	constitute	a	hierarchy	in	terms	of	their	a priori appeal	to	those	in	
predicaments,	their	actual	use	is	not	governed	by	their	a priori	appeal	alone.	
If	it	were,	virtually	everyone	would	simply	deny	all	bad	things	and	virtu-
ally	no	one	would	confess.	To	be	sure,	the	data	in	Table	1	suggest	that	these	
categories	of	accounts	have	a	hierarchical	appeal	based	on	their	ability	to	
protect	the	account-giver’s	image.	The	most	telling	evidence	in	this	respect	is	
the	differential	popularity	of	confessions	among	proponents	and	opponents.	
Confessions	provided	proponents	of	King	Day	and	the	new	state	flag	with	an	
attractive	way	out	of	their	predicament	after	these	referenda	measures	were	
voted	down.	They	could	say,	in	effect,	“This	was	an	act	of	racism,”	without	
portraying	themselves	as	racists,	for	they	had	supported	the	proposal.	This	
account	might	not	be	ideal	since	it	would	reflect	adversely	on	their	home	
state,	but	it	would	at	least	allow	them	to	deflect	personal	blame.	By	contrast,	
any	such	account	by	an	opponent	would,	in	today’s	racial	climate,	be	socially	
unacceptable;	branding	oneself	and	one’s	allies	as	racists	hardly	constitutes	
a	face-saving	strategy.
	 The	plausibility	of	an	account	is	also	a	factor	in	determining	which	account	
type	an	account-giver	will	choose.	No	matter	how	appealing	an	account	may	
be	on	other	grounds,	if	it	flies	in	the	face	of	common	sense	or	brute	empirical	
reality,	it	is	unlikely	to	be	used	since	it	reduces	the	credibility	of	the	account-
giver.	For	example,	one	such	implausible	account	was	the	(perhaps	facetious)	
attempt	of	one	Arizonan	to	hold	women	responsible	for	the	defeat	of	the	King	
holiday	in	order	to	ensure	the	cancellation	of	the	Tempe	Super	Bowl	(Hatfield	
1990).	Most	account-givers	in	our	study	seem	to	resist	the	temptation	to	offer	
an	account	that	was	apt	to	be	dismissed	as	far-fetched,	even	if	its	acceptance	
promises	exculpation.
	 Finally,	these	cases	provide	considerable	evidence	that	accounts	mat-
ter.	Since	practical	politics	is	an	iterative	game,	the	accounts	offered	and	
accepted	today	affect	the	political	environment	in	which	future	iterations	of	
the	political	game	will	be	played	(Bennett	1980).	In	her	experimental	work,	
McGraw	(1991)	found	that	the	most	effective	accounts	tended	to	be	ones	that	
claimed	mitigating	circumstances	or	those	that	invoked	normative	principles	
to	justify	behavior.	In	Arizona,	one	of	the	most	common	accounts	offered	
by	supporters	of	the	King	holiday	was	the	mitigating	denial	that	the	voters	
did	not	really	reject	the	proposed	holiday,	since	there	was	majority	support	
for	some	sort	of	King	holiday	in	one	form	or	another.	Is	it	surprising,	then,	
that	a	mere	two	years	after	its	loss	in	1992,	there	was	enough	public	sup-
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port	to	get	the	King	holiday	back	on	the	ballot,	and	that	this	time,	it	passed	
by	a	substantial	61–39	margin?	In	contrast,	in	Mississippi,	one	of	the	most	
common	accounts	offered	by	opponents	of	the	new	flag	was	to	invoke	the	
normative	principle	of	popular	will,	defending	the	outcome	as	the	vox populi.	
The	fact	that	opponents	of	the	new	flag	were	able	to	wrap	an	account	of	
the	referendum	outcome	in	the	language	of	popular	sovereignty	may	go	far	
toward	explaining	why	the	flag	issue	has	been	largely	dormant	since	the	2001	
referendum.
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	 1.	Terminologies	used	in	the	psychological	and	sociological	literature	on	this	subject	
vary.	Some	(Bennett	1980)	use	“account”	to	refer	only	to	justifications	and	excuses,	while	
others	(Lyman	and	Scott	1968)	use	the	term	more	inclusively	to	refer	to	any	explanation	
of	why	an	untoward	event	occurred.	Similarly,	“excuse”	is	often	used	to	refer	to	stories	
of	extenuating	circumstances	(Tedeschi	and	Norman	1985),	but	this	term	is	sometimes	
stretched	to	encompass	justifications	or	even	denials	of	involvement	(Snyder	1985).
	 2.	An	example	from	presidential	politics	is	instructive:	“[M]any	Democratic	activists	
in	November,	1988,	promoted	the	view	that	Michael	Dukakis’s	loss	was	Dukakis’s	own	
fault—his	staff	was	disorganized,	he	failed	to	respond	to	Bush’s	attacks—because	this	
explanation	would	imply	that	the	voters	had	not	repudiated	the	Democratic	party	or	its	
philosophy,	but	rather	that	the	party	simply	needs	a	more	effective	candidate	in	1992.	
On	the	other	hand,	many	Republicans	tried	to	convince	others	that	the	problem	wasn’t	
Dukakis’s	shortcomings,	but	the	fact	that	he	was	solidly	within	the	Democratic	main-
stream,	which	is	what	the	voters	really	rejected.	If	this	explanation	were	to	dominate,	
it	would	suggest	that	officeholders,	if	they	want	to	build	more	public	support	for	the	
next	election,	ought	to	vote	for	Republican	initiatives	in	the	meantime”	(Hershey	1992,	
946).
	 3.	We	very	much	assume	in	our	analysis	that	account-givers	are	at	least	somewhat	on	
the	defensive.	Indeed,	defensiveness	is	probably	the	basis	of	predicaments	that	produce	
interesting	political	accounts.	Such	accounts	are	an	attempt	to	“explain	unanticipated	or	
untoward	behavior”	(Lyman	and	Scott	1968).	In	our	cases,	even	strong	opponents	of	the	
new	flag	in	Mississippi	and	of	creating	a	King	holiday	in	Arizona	were	cognizant	that	their	
positions	were	not	in	the	majority	in	the	country	as	a	whole	and	that	they	would	be	well-
served	by	responses	that	offered	some	insight,	explanation,	or	argument	that	would	absolve	
themselves	and	their	states	from	charges	of	racism.
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	 4.	The	difference	in	the	efforts	behind	the	pro-	and	anti-King	holiday	campaigns	is	
succinctly	conveyed	by	the	undisputed	claim	of	an	anti-King-Day	leader	that	the	pro-
holiday	forces	spent	almost	$1	million,	while	the	opposition	campaign	spent	only	a	token	
$3,000	(Flannery	1990a).
	 5.	The	design	of	the	proposed	flag	was	similar	in	many	ways	to	that	of	the	existing	flag.	
The	major	proposed	change	was	the	replacement	of	the	Confederate	battle	flag	image	in	
the	upper	left	quadrant	with	a	blue	square	containing	19	small	white	stars	(representing	
the	existing	states	as	of	1819	when	Mississippi	became	a	state)	surrounding	one	large	
white	star	(representing	Mississippi).	This	design	was	based	on	the	“Bonnie	Blue	Flag”	
first	flown	in	1810.
	 6.	In	an	analysis	of	white	Mississippians’	attitudes	on	the	flag	issue,	Orey	(2004)	found	
that	“old-fashioned	racism”	was	the	strongest	predictor	of	support	for	the	old	flag.	Rein-
gold	and	Wike	(1998)	came	to	this	conclusion	regarding	a	similar	vote	in	Georgia	(see	
also	Clark	1997).
	 7.	Sigelman	and	Walkosz	(1992)	report	the	results	of	a	proprietary	survey	of	Arizonans	
conducted	in	the	wake	of	the	King	holiday	vote.	As	the	authors	note,	however,	the	data	
themselves	are	not	available	for	analysis.
	 8.	We	also	believe	that	the	best	media	sources	for	finding	well-developed	accounts	are	
newspapers,	since	they	tend	to	be	far	better	and	more	extensively	archived	than	television	
or	radio	broadcasts	or	pages	on	the	internet.
	 9.	For	example,	the	Arizona	survey	used	by	Sigelman	and	Walkosz	(1992)	was	completed	
over	a	three-day	period	within	a	week	of	the	King	Day	referendum.	As	those	authors	
note,	the	publicized	accounts	that	appeared	later	in	the	media	differed	somewhat	from	
the	survey	results	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	referendum.	See	also	Hershey	(1992)	
regarding	account	“winnowing.”
	 10.	We	omitted	four	dailies,	because	they	were	unavailable	due	to	their	small,	confined,	
local	circulation.	Together,	these	account	for	only	six	percent	of	daily	newspaper	circula-
tion	in	the	state	in	1990.
	 11.	This	group	of	account-givers	corresponds	very	closely	with	those	analyzed	by	Sigel-
man	and	Walkosz	(1992).
	 12.	We	analyzed	these	accounts	broken	down	according	to	whether	they	had	been	
offered	by	letter-writers	or	other	members	of	the	general	public,	public	notables,	or	
newspaper	columnists	or	editorialists,	but	these	comparisons	did	not	prove	illuminat-
ing	and	are	not	presented	here	(they	are	available	upon	request	from	the	authors).	Our	
inability	to	classify	these	57	account-givers	does	not	mean	that	they	were	neutral	on	the	
issue;	indeed,	we	suspect	that	few	of	them	were	neutral.	They	were	unclassified	because	
the	accounts	they	offered	simply	did	not	provide	sufficient	evidence	for	a	definitive	
classification	as	proponents	or	opponents.
	 13.	See	Sigelman	and	Walkosz	1992	(941)	for	coding	techniques	and	inter-coder	reli-
ability	measures,	which	were	in	excess	of	90	percent	for	our	study.	As	Sigelman	and	Walkosz	
found,	the	categories	are	not	mutually	exclusive,	since	a	single	account	could	express	senti-
ments	from	more	than	one	of	our	categories.	Thus,	the	percentages	reported	in	Table	1	
sum	in	excess	of	100	percent.
	 14.	Two	newspapers	were	unavailable	to	us	due	to	their	small,	confined,	local	circula-
tion.	They	accounted	for	only	nine	percent	of	daily	newspaper	circulation	in	2001.
	 15.	We	performed	a	check	of	inter-coder	reliability	using	a	random	sample	of	72	of	the	
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211	sources	(29	percent),	finding	coders	to	be	88	percent	consistent	in	their	handling	
of	the	accounts.
	 16.	Leaders	of	the	pro-King	holiday	campaign	explicitly	urged	supporters	to	vote	for	
Proposition	302	and	against	Proposition	301.	A	post-election	poll	estimated	that	63	percent	
of	the	voters	had	supported	either	301	or	302	(Flannery	1990b).
	 17.	It	is	worth	remembering	that	the	Arizona	referendum	occurred	less	than	a	year	
after	the	first	explosive	media	reports	that	archivists	working	with	the	Martin	Luther	
King	Papers	Project	had	found	evidence	that	sizeable	portions	of	Dr.	King’s	1955	doctoral	
dissertation	in	theology	at	Boston	University	had	been	plagiarized.
	 18.	Proponents	of	the	new	flag	sometimes	openly	ridiculed	such	justifications.	Nation-
ally	syndicated	and	Mississippi-born	columnist	William	Raspberry	put	it	this	way:	“Why,	
lawdy	me,	this	wasn’t	about	race	at	all.	It	was	about	honoring	great	grandpa’s	memory,	
about	standing	up	for	the	right	of	the	South	to	be	a	special	place,	about	defending	the	
southern	way	of	life”	(Raspberry	2001,	A15).	It	is	worth	noting	that	we	coded	Raspberry’s	
account	as	a	confession:	“I	had	dared	harbor	the	(faint)	hope	that	white	voters	might	
welcome	the	chance	to	catapult	the	state	into	modernity.	.	.	.	[But]	I	suspect	race	was	
foremost	on	the	agenda.”
	 19.	The	following	passage	from	a	Phoenix Gazette	column	is	representative:	“All	those	
people	.	.	.	who	voted	against	the	Martin	Luther	King	Jr.	holiday	.	.	.	probably	started	out	
in	suburban	Chicago,	or	maybe	Nebraska	or	South	Dakota,	where	people	turn	65,	move	
to	Arizona,	and	vote	against	everything.	They	don’t	like	schools,	mass	transit,	toxic	waste	
cleanups,	museums,	dogs,	cats,	or	little	children.	So	why	should	they	vote	in	favor	of	a	
paid	holiday	for	a	civil	rights	leader?”	(Spratt	1990).	Retirees	and	rural	area	residents	
were	singled	out	more	often	than	any	other	group	as	sources	of	the	King	holiday	defeat,	
but	there	were	scattered	references	to	other	groups	as	well.
	 20.	However,	there	was	virtually	a	one-to-one	ratio	between	the	white	proportion	of	
a	county’s	voting	age	population	and	the	percentage	of	voters	in	the	county	who	voted	
to	retain	the	old	state	flag	(Klinkner	2001).
	 21.	For	instance,	consider	the	following	headlines	and	statements	from	the	state’s	
largest	newspaper,	the	Clarion Ledger	(full	citations	available	on	request):	“Many	blacks	
were	not	against	the	old	flag”;	“NAACP	talk	of	a	boycott	is	laughable:	Low	black	voter	
turnout	on	flag	issue	says	everything;”	“Talk	of	a	boycott	as	a	reaction	to	the	state	flag	
vote	seems	laughable—for	whether	the	NAACP	can	digest	it	or	not,	a	significant	portion	
of	the	blame	for	the	failure	of	the	referendum	that	sought	to	change	the	state	flag	lies	
at	the	feet	of	black	Mississippians	who	sat	the	election	out	and	didn’t	vote”;	“Did	black	
residents	vote	to	keep	flag?”;	“Flag:	Many	black	residents	just	didn’t	vote,	East	Miss.	
Voters	League	head	says.”
	 22.	Given	the	pre-referendum	focus	on	“heritage,	not	hate”	themes,	it	is	perhaps	
surprising	not	to	see	greater	differences	among	the	justifications	offered	by	proponents	
and	opponents	of	the	new	flag.	In	the	wake	of	the	vote,	many	opponents	seemed	to	
focus	on	the	plebiscitary	nature	of	the	outcome	rather	than	on	making	justifications.	
For	instance,	consider	the	following	headlines	and	statements	from	the	Clarion Ledger	
(full	citations	available	on	request):	“Leave	Flag	alone,	people	have	voted”;	“Get	over	
losing	vote	for	new	flag”;	“Time	to	admit	the	people	won”;	“In	spite	of	the	Clarion 
Ledger using	enough	ink	to	float	a	battleship	vilifying	the	state	flag,	the	good	people	
of	Mississippi	resoundingly	voted	to	keep	it.”	Given	the	appeal	of	invocations	of	the	
normative	principle	of	popular	rule	(a	point	to	which	we	will	return	later),	this	shift	
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may	have	been	quite	reasonable.	It	is	also	evidence	of	the	“winnowing”	of	accounts	
observed	by	Hershey	(1992).
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